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Abstract 
China's photovoltaic (PV) based electricity generating capacity is obviously lagging 
behind the world level, although its manufacturing capacity of PV cells and modules  
has remained ahead worldwide since 2006. The Chinese government is the major 
investor contributing to PV-based installed generating capacity in China. A trial 
subsidy policy has been implemented by the Chinese government since 2007 to 
encourage the participation of enterprise investment. In terms of Chinese 
government's goals on installed PV-based generating capacity in 2010 and 2020, the 
historical data shows a sluggish development trend, which raises doubts about the 
viability of the government's goals. A system dynamics model was built to study the 
problem and used to design and test policy options for increasing installed PV-based 
generating capacity in China. It was found that lack of funds and inactive enterprise 
investment are the major reasons for the sluggish unfolding of China's installed 
PV-based generating capacity. Several policy suggestions are developed 
correspondingly, one of which is to increase PV fraction so as to solve the funds 
constraints, another of which is to raise up the subsidy granted to the enterprises to 
catalyze enterprise investment to accelerate the development of PV-based generating 
capacity in China. 
 
Key words:  photovoltaic (PV) electricity generating capacity, Photovoltaic (PV) 
manufacturing industry, subsidy policy, generating cost, system 
dynamics  
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1 Introduction 
Exploration of renewable energy has been put on the agenda in China from the 
perspective of both economic development and environmental protection (Zheng & 
Liu, 2005). The unprecedented economic growth in China has claimed huge energy 
consumption. However, conventional energy resources will finally be exhausted in the 
long run, which would then hold back economic development. On the other hand, 
with the coal-dominance energy structure in China, pollutant emission and discharge 
exert much pressure to the ecological environment.  
To achieve the sustainable development for energy and environment, Solar 
photovoltaic (PV) has attracted increasing attention in recent years as a technology 
capable of delivering sustainable electricity supplies and releasing the burden of fossil 
fuels on the environment (Tim Jackson and Mark Oliver, 2000). Compared with 
conventional power generation technology, PV solar electricity is a method to produce 
electricity without moving parts, emissions or noise-and all this by converting 
abundant sunlight without practical limitations (Winfried Hoffmann, 2006).  
There has been an explosion in global PV market, and that has boosted China's 
PV manufacturing industry in recent years, but not the domestic installation of PV- 
generated electricity (PVG). China possesses of sizable manufacturing capacity of PV 
cells and modules (PVM)1, which has remained ahead worldwide since 2006. It 
ranked the biggest solar cells manufacture in the world with 1.78GWp output in 2008, 
accounting for 26% of the world's total (Zhang, 2009). However, the drastic 
development of PVM in China is mainly driven by the oversea demand instead of 
domestic market demand. Among all the PV cells and modules output in China, more 
than 90% are exported abroad. In other words, the domestic application of PV 
products is obviously lagging behind its manufacturing. In 2008, the PVG in China 
was 40MWp, accounting for only 2.43% in the world total and 2.25% of its output.  
                                                        
1
 To be simplified, the abbreviation of PVG will be used to stand for installed PV generated electricity 
capacity and PVM is for manufacturing capacity of PV cells and modules in the paper. 
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China’s PVG has been suffering a sluggish development since its initial 
application in 1970s. Last decade witnessed a relatively high progress, but the growth 
rate is still slow.  
China has favorable conditions in utilizing solar photovoltaic technology. More 
than 2/3 of China's territory is covered by abundant solar energy; with annual quantity 
radiation reaches 60 hundred million joule/sq.m. The solar energy absorbed by the 
earth's surface amounts to 1.7 trillion tons of standard coal, especially in the area like 
the northwest part, Tibet and Yunnan etc. (China's Renewable Energy Report, 2006)  
Photovoltaic cells in China were successfully applied to the launch of DF2 
satellite in 1971. The first land application was the navigation light at Tianjin harbor 
in 1973. In the 1980s, the rudiments of the PV industry appeared in China with quite 
low annual output at expensive price.  
 
Table 1-1 Annual output of PV cells and annual PVG in Chin from 1976-2008（KWp） 
Year 1976 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2002 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Annual 
Output 
0.5 8 70 500 1550 3300 10000 50000 200000 369500 1086957 1780000 
Annual 
PVG 
0.5 8 70 500 1550 3300 20300 10000 5000 10000 20000 40000 
Source: China's PV industry Report 2006-2007. Data of 2007 and 2008 is from Energy Industry 
Research Center 
 
Table 1-1 illustrates the annual manufacturing output of PV cells and PVG in 
China from 1976 to 2008. Although both of the annual output and PVG have been 
growing steadily after 1995, annual PVG is obviously lagging behind the output. 
Compared with the development rate of global PVG, the disparity is still wider.    
We can see in Figure 1-1 that the global PVG has been developing with the average 
annual growth rate 42% in the last 12 yeas. In 2008, the global annual output of PV 
cells has reached 6.85 Gwp and cumulative PVG is 5.5 Gwp (Energy Industry 
Research Center, 2009). 
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Figure 1-1. Annual growth rate of global PVG 
Source: China's PV industry Development Report 2007. Data of 2007 and 2008 is from Energy 
Industry Research Center 
 
In September 2007, the State plans for medium and long-term development of 
renewable energy announced that the ratio of renewable energy consumption to the 
whole energy consumption should be increased from currently 8% to 15% in 2020. 
High priorities have been given to hydropower, bio-power, wind power and solar PV 
power. The estimated total investment reaches 2 trillion CNY. It also set the targets for 
each system. With respect to the solar PV, the target cumulative installed capacity is 
300MW in 2010 and 1800MW in 2020, which only occupy 0.68% and 1% of the 
world respectively, even when implemented successfully (PV Industry, 2007).  
The focus for this paper is to model the sluggish unfolding of China's PVG over 
time and test subsidy incentive policy options for accelerating the development of 
domestic PV-based electricity generating capacity, particularly in light with the 
government’s energy goals. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Major problems regarding PVG 
development are elaborated in the following section. Then relevant research on 
similar problems are reviewed at section 3. Section 4 illustrates the dynamic 
hypothesis including Causal Loop Diagram (CLD) and Stock & Flow Diagram (SFD). 
Model validation is then exhibited in section 5, followed by policy test and discussion 
in section 6. The paper concludes with a summary and future work. System dynamics 
concepts and terminology can be found in the appendix in the end of the paper.  
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2. Defining the Problem dynamically  
The dynamic problem to be addressed in this paper is the sluggish development 
of PVG in China from 1995 to 2008 and it's possible trend compared with the 
relatively high government's goals in the year 2010 and 2020. 
We can see from Table 1-1 that both annual PV cells output and PVG in China 
were suffering slow development before 1995. From the late 1990s, China's annual 
PVG started the gradual development with the annual growth rate around 20%1. 
Although so, the PV systems used in China's domestic market is far below the world 
average growth level in the corresponding period (Figure 1-1).  
Because of the discrete data we got so far in China before 1995, plus the 
insignificant development of PV systems in use then, we take the time horizon from 
the year 1995 to 2008 as the focus in this research. Table 2-1 shows the annual and 
cumulative PVG in China from 1995 to 2008. 
 
Source: New Materials Report, April, 2006; data of 06-08 is from Analysis Report of PV subsidy 
(2009-03-27) 
 
Figure 2-1 is derived directly from Table 2-1, which makes the tendencies of 
changing easier to read. The reference mode in the whole time horizon appears 
exponential - like, but the growth rate is still very low - thus producing a sluggish 
growth.  
 
                                                        
1
 It is calculated by reference to Table 1-1. 
Table 2-1 Annual and cumulative PVG in China from 1995-2008 (KWp) 
 Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Cumulative  6630 8800 11100 13300 16300 19000 24700 45000 55000 65000 70000 80000 100000 140000 
Annual  1550 2200 2300 2200 3000 3300 5700 20300 10000 10000 5000 10000 20000 40000 
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Figure 2-1. Annual and cumulative PVG in China 
 
Based on the Plan of National Solar PV Development (1996-2000) compiled by 
the Power Ministry，the goal for PVG in China was 66MWp in 2000 and 300MWp in 
2020. The goal was revised in the State Plans for Medium and Long-term 
Development of Renewable Energy in 2007, where 300MWp is planned to be 
achieved in 2010 and a new goal for 2020 is 1800MWp. Figure 2-2 portrays the 
development of government goals on China's PV capacity from 1995 to 2020. 
 
 
Figure 2-2. Government’s goals on PVG in China  
Source: (State Plans on PV, 2007) 
Let's assume that the PV installed capacity will develop along with its historical 
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trend and forecast the volumes in 2010 and 2020 by simple curve-fitting. Figure 2-2 
shows the difference between government’s goals and the forecasted values. We can 
see the gap between the goals and the forecasted values. Besides, the Action Plan of 
New Energy is going to be introduced by the National Energy Bureau, which might 
expand the development scale of PV installed capacity in China to 100000MWp in 
2020, five times bigger than the original goal (New Jing, 2009). 
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Figure 2-3. Comparison between government’s goals and forecasted values of PVG in 
China 
 
From the above compare, we can deduce that the cumulative PVG in China will 
be much lower than the government’s goals in 2020 if the unfolding of PVG is with 
its original growth rate. The focus for this research is firstly to build the basic 
structure to find out the reasons for the sluggish development of PVG in China from 
1995 to 2008 in terms of the current operating mechanism. Then the model is used to 
forecast the future development trend of PVG to 2020 under the trial subsidy policy 
and see the viability of the government’s goals. Policy options are designed and tested 
for increasing PVG in China in the coming decade.  
3. Literature review 
There has been much research addressing the PV market issues. In terms of the 
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factors that accelerate PV market, relevant literatures can be divided into three 
categories: methodologies used in the study of PV market diffusion, factors that 
determine the cost of PV system, and subsidy policies or programs implemented in 
different countries. The following parts will be displayed according to the above 
sequence. 
3.1 Methodologies used in studying PV market diffusion 
The wide use of PV generating system is still in its infancy in China. Research 
on PV market development remains the level of qualitative analysis and uptrend 
forecasting. Zhang (2007) analyzes the current status of China's PV industry and 
forecasts the PV market share from 2010 to 2050. Several PV industry reports (2006, 
2007, 2008) deduce the possible PV market size for the next decades both worldwide 
and China. All these research address the desirable PVG in the future, but lack 
quantitative analysis and practical measures. Although Chen (2008) explored the 
effect of enterprise strategy on the performance of PV system using value chain theory, 
it is only from theoretical and qualitative perspective. 
With respect to the international research on this field, modeling and empirical 
study are the major methods. Fayssal (1989) presents a probabilistic approach based 
on Markov Chain Theory to model stand-alone PV power system and predict their 
long-term service performance. Stijin etc. (2009) undertake an empirical study of the 
solar photovoltaic (PV) industry using evolutionary economic concepts. They identify 
the innovation and selection forces that drive the changes in the solar PV industry. A 
quantitative analysis using diversity indexes is performed at four levels of the solar 
PV industry: countries, technologies, applications and companies. Paul D. Maycock 
(1994) obtained the forecasting of international photovoltaic markets and 
developments to 2010.  
Though the above research uses quantitative methods in predicting the 
development of PV market, what is shown to us is the specific future or a blueprint, 
which is static and discrete. PV market itself is a complex and dynamic system, 
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certain internal mechanism is driving its unfolding which needs to study. That's why 
we are going to use system dynamics in this research.  
3.2 Factors that determine the cost in the field of PV system 
The global PV market nearly quadrupled from 1995 to 2000 due to a 
combination of technical improvements and supportive policies (Maycock, 2001). 
Several close observers of the PV industry argue that a virtuous circle of increased 
demand, expanding production facilities, improved performance and falling costs are 
pushing PVs ever closer towards convergence with mainstream grid-connected 
electricity sources (Jackson etc., 2000). Still expensive by comparison with 
conventional generation technologies, grid-connected PV applications have been 
slower to emerge both internationally and internally. So, it is necessary to find out 
factors that determine the cost.  
Paul (1997) concluded that: significant cost reduction; several new thin film 
plants are being built with greatly reduced costs; government subsidized volume 
orders for PV in grid-connected houses; environmental benefits for PV are being 
applied in Europe and Japan permitting “early adopters” to enter the market; 
government and commercial acceptance of PV building integrated products. The 
combination of these forces lead to the “accelerated” market mode could start in 2000. 
SEMI PV Group (2009) takes that future cost reductions will come from process 
cost reductions, including economics of scale, materials, automation, and improved 
cell efficiency, involving cell structure and process and materials innovation. It also 
forecasted the future cost reduction trend under these considerations (Figure 3-1). 
Turkenburg (2000) forecasted that given the opportunities for further 
technological improvement and market expansion, the cost of PV systems could fall 
to some targets. If these cost targets are met, PV power would become economical in 
a much wider range of applications. (Geller, 2003)  
All the above research can be concluded that technology improvement and 
economics of scale are the main forces in driving the cost reduction in PV system. 
 14 
Just as Schaeffer et al. (2004) projected, for large scale PV, 46% of the cost reduction 
comes from scale and 31% from efficiency improvements.  
Because the aim of this paper is to design subsidy policies, which mainly relates 
to cost, and we are not going to address the production sector of PV products. What 
we suppose to do is to find out reasonable empirical research and applied the cost 
decline trend into the model. 
 
 
Figure 3-1: The estimated cost reduction of PV system 
Source: (SEMI PV Group, 2009) 
 
Madonald and Schrattenlolzer (2001) argue that for most products and services, 
it is the accumulation of experience that leads to cost reduction. Therefore, learning 
curves can be contributed to interpret the cost decline trend. Zheng and Liu (2005) 
studied the linear relation of bottom prices and learning rates and estimate the learing 
rate of China's PV system is between 22%-34%. There is already much estimation 
from international scholars. IEA's estimated learning rate is 21% in EU countries. 
Madonald and Schrattenlolzer (2001) postulated that the post-volatility period 
corresponds to the stability stage of the IEA/BCG model, a learning rate of 17% 
would be more appropriate in long-term energy models. 
Clayton Handleman (2005) also concluded that in a relatively stable market, 
average wholesale PV module costs will drop 17% for every doubling of cumulative 
production. Harmon's estimated PV industry learning rate is 20%; Maycock and 
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Wakefield estimated the learning rate in the US is 22%, and both of their 
achievements are under the assumption that the minimum price is zero (Zheng and 
Liu, 2005). Nemet (2006) used empirical data to populate a cost model and gauged 
the plausibility of future cost targets by different scenarios (Figure 3-2). Because of 
the existed learning curve rule, we can tell the public and government that they can 
accelerate cost reduction by stimulating demand.  
The average cost of PV system is relatively the same all over the world, so the 
learning curve rule also suits China. 
 
 
Figure 3-2: Scenarios comparing cost model, experience curves, and $1.00/W target 
price (Nemet, 2006) 
3.3 Subsidy policies or programs implemented in different countries 
    Along with the rising prices for conventional energy and a major concern on 
environmental climate problems, great attention has been given to PV by governments 
of all countries, especially developed countries. Varieties of policy incentives 
implemented by the governments contribute to the fast development of PVG. China 
can learn from these subsidy policies or programs to improve its domestic PVG. 
In terms of the necessity of subsidies on PV industry, Sanden (2005) takes that 
infant technologies, such as solar photovoltaic (PV), are normally inferior to 
entrenched technologies with respect to cost and performance. It is a Catch-22 
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situation since the diffusion on larger market that would be needed to reduce cost is 
hindered by the high cost. Therefore a conventional policy option is to subsidize PV 
to increase sales, which would increase experience and induce investments in larger 
factories, which in turn would drive down costs and the subsidies needed. 
A market support program is likely to create not only economic virtuous circles 
that reduce costs, but also institutional virtuous circles that work for the survival and 
expansion of the program itself. The current growth of the PV market is dependent on 
subsidy programs, mainly in Japan and Germany.  
Liu (2009) sums up the three main subsidy patterns implemented currently in the 
world: setting the on-grid price, construction project subsidy and the combination of 
both. 
The first pattern is to design the on-grid price by the government, which has 
driven the PV market in Germany and Spain developing rapidly. Renewable Energies 
Sources Act (EEG in German) mandates that owners of PV equipment, such as solar 
systems, be paid a "feed-in tariff" for solar energy that is sold into the public grid. The 
tariff remains the same for 20 years, thus making it profitable for homeowners, 
businesses, and other institutions to own solar panels and add to the share of 
renewable energies in Germany's power grid (SEMI, 2008).  
The EEG calls for the "feed-in tariff" to fall every year, to encourage the industry 
to find efficiencies and cost reductions. The reformed EEG, recently approved by both 
houses of Germany's legislature, has set the annual reduction at between eight and ten 
percent in 2009 and 2010 and nine percent annually for 2011 and onwards.  
The other pattern is like what Japan is doing to give subsidy to the construction 
of PV projects directly. The Science &Technology Policy in Japan planed to invest 
180 billion US dollars in the following 5 years to boost up its global competitiveness. 
A major part of the money has been used to subsidy PV projects. 
The US combines these two patterns by giving the small PV system construction 
subsidy or designing on-grid price; those big PV systems can be applied certain 
on-grid price. The initial on-grid price is $0.39 per KWh, which keeps for 5 years and 
decreases year by year (Jie, 2009).  
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China's development of PVG is mainly the action of the government. During the 
6th Five-year Plan (1981-1985) and the 7th Five-year Plan (1986-1990), Chinese 
government have been the major investor to sustain the development of PV industry, 
where enterprise investment only accounted for about 20% of the total. The main 
supported programs started from 2002 by the former State Planning Commission for 
the government to invest PV market in rural areas. The promulgated of Renewable 
Energy Promotion Law in early 2006, gives PV the priority development area in the 
national energy strategy (Huang, 2007).  
Because of the sluggish development of PVG in China, the government started to 
provide subsidy incentives to enterprises to accelerate the PVG. According to the 
experience of developed countries, the large application of PV is stimulated by 
instituting on-grid PV price. The attempt became active in China after 2006 when the 
government started to give construction subsidy to enterprise investment on PVG at a 
fixed subsidy percentage, currently is 60%. And the generated electricity is planed to 
connect to the state grid by negotiated price. It is a trial policy, which is used by the 
government to see the reaction of enterprises. The validity of the policy should be 
subject to the test of practice.   
From the above review of relative literatures, we can conclude that there is rare 
quantitative research on the development of China’s PVG. So we introduce a system 
dynamics model to analyze this issue, which will address the dynamic problem. Cost 
reduction trend in PV is recognized globally with technology improvement and 
economies of scale. We will take the cost reduction trend in the model to see its effect 
on the average installation cost. Subsidy polices will also be tested in the policy 
analysis section. 
4. Dynamic hypothesis and model description 
 The main pattern in the reference mode appears exponential-like, but with the 
very slow growth rate, thus it is sluggish growth in the development of China's PVG 
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from 1995 to 2008. It is obvious that there exists problematic gap between the 
government's goals and the extrapolated trend line (Figure 2-3). A system dynamics 
model will be built to represent the hypothesis for the historical pattern and then 
project to see the gap between the model's expected behavior and the government's 
goals.  
A diagram showing the interaction among subsystem is illustrated in Figure 4-1. 
The model can be divided into four sectors. Capacity construction sector links the 
external factors – government’s goals and the internal budget source sector by using 
available investment in constructing capacity. This sector together with the cost sector 
decides the budget sector. Available funds are from the surcharge of total electricity 
demand. Total electricity demand is from external factors, GDP and electricity 
intensity. The diagram shows us the conceptual framework of the model.  
Causal loop diagrams will be displayed to show the feedback processes, which 
might account for the problematic behavior at Figure 2-2. After illustrating model 
boundaries and assumptions, model structures will be shown by stock and flow 
diagrams with the same logic as the subsystem diagram. Model formulation follows 
thereafter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-1. Subsystem diagram 
Electricity demand 
sector 
-surcharge of bills 
-total electricity 
demand 
-... 
Cost sector 
-average cost per unit 
of capacity 
-average installation 
cost 
-... 
 
Budget sector 
-subsidy percentage 
-desired order rate 
-indicated budget 
-... 
 
Capacity 
construction sector 
-capacity installed 
-capacity on order 
-construction start 
-... 
 
Government’s goals  
Budget source sector 
-PV fraction 
-available funds for PV 
-government investment 
-.... 
 
real GDP 
Electricity intensity 
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4.1 Causal loop diagram 
     The development of domestic PVG is characterized by the accumulation of 
Capacity Installed1. Firstly let's look at the process of how Capacity Installed is 
accumulated.  
    Reinforcing feedback loop R1: Improving Capacity Installed by cost 
reduction 
Figure 4-2 shows a simple loop which reflects the process. The lower the avg 
installation cost, the more Capacity Installed will be constructed.  
 
CAPACITY
INSTALLED
CAPACITY ON
ORDER
+
construction time
-
average cost per unit of
capacity installed
avg installation
cost
+
R1
-
available
investment
construction start
+
+
-
 
Figure 4-2. Causal loop diagram: Reinforcing feedback loop R1    
  
    Because the unit cost of newly installed capacity is much lower than ever, the 
newly adding capacity can dilutes the the average installation cost. Assuming 
available investment stays constant, lower avg installation cost will produce higher 
construction start, which will eventually increase Capacity Installed, say Capacity on 
Order. Thus the reinforcing loop R1 will drive the system growth exponentially. 
    Reinforcing feedback loop R2: Cost reduction increasing enterprise 
profitability 
                                                        
1
 Capacity Installed is also used to stand for installed PV-based electricity generating capacity. PVG 
and Capacity Installed are used interchangeably in the paper. 
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 In fact, available investment is not constant at all, which comes from 
government investment and enterprise investment. Another feedback loop R2 is added 
to the reinforcing loop R1 in Figure 4-3, which affects the amount of enterprise 
investment. Government investment will be discussed soon. 
 
avg generating cost
with subsidy
CAPACITY
INSTALLED
subsidy percentage
-
R2
CAPACITY ON
ORDER
+
construction time
-
average cost per unit of
capacity installed
avg installation cost
R1
+
-
available
investment
expected profitability
of new investment
-
enterprise
investment+
+
government
investment
+
thermal
generating cost
+
construction start
+
+
-
life time
avg operating
hours
++
+
 
Figure 4-3. Causal loop diagram: reinforcing feedback loop R1 and R2 
 
    As discussed before, the government instead of enterprises has been the major 
investor of China's PVG. Enterprise investment was previously a small percentage of 
the total. We just assume that enterprises were on their breakeven point, so there was 
no intention to expand investment. Avg generating cost with subsidy is converted 
from avg installation cost by considering avg operating hours, life time of installed 
capacity and subsidy percentage. Subsidy percentage is set by the decision makers to 
cover part of the PV installation cost and increase the profitability of enterprises.  
Compared with the thermal generating cost, which serves as the on-grid PV price 
at present (Currently, the on-grid PV price is not determined in large scale, only 
negotiated price is handled case by case. But at least the state grid can buy PV 
generated electricity as the same price as the thermal electricity. That's why we use 
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thermal generating cost here.). Under a certain on-grid price, lower avg generating 
cost with subsidy leads to higher profitability, which will improve enterprise 
investment. The reinforcing feedback loop R2 further drives up Capacity Installed 
together with the feedback loop R1. That's also one of the reasons why the 
government has the intention to encourage enterprise investment.  
 Counteracting feedback loop C1: Cost reduction cutting short desired 
budget 
avg generating cost
with subsidy
indicated budget
CAPACITY
INSTALLED
subsidy percentage
-
des order rate
AVAILABLE
FUNDS FOR PV
DESIRED BUDGET
+
R2
+
CAPACITY ON
ORDER
+
construction time
-
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Figure 4-4. Causal loop diagram: Counteracting feedback loop C1 
 
    With the above logic, Capacity Installed will keep on growing without any limit, 
which is obviously not the truth. Available investment will be one of the constraint. 
Total sustainable funds are collected from total electricity demand, which is used to 
support the development of renewable energy, including wind, bio-fuels, etc.   
Available Funds For PV is a fraction of the total amount. Desired Budget is supposed 
to be the decision makers' perception, which is adjusted by the change of indicated 
budget. Indicated budget is the money needed to fill up the desired order rate under 
the certain installation cost. At this stage, we just assume the desired order rate is 
constant.  
 22 
As we discussed before, average installation cost is decreasing with the 
increasing of Capacity Installed, but the mitigated average cost will also shrink the 
amount of indicated budget. At the same time, Desired Budget is decreasing as well, 
which means it needs lower government investment deriving from Available Funds 
For PV. The less available investment, the less construction start occurs, which will 
reduce Capacity Installed in return. Thus the counteracting loop C1 (Figure 4-4) limits 
the growth of reinforcing loop R1 and R2. Another possibility is that available funds 
for PV might be a constraint which limits government investment when available fund 
is less then desired budget. At that time, government investment will be determined by 
available funds instead of desired budget.  
Counteracting feedback loop C2: Capacity gap adjustment 
 
capacity gap
des PV capacity
+
avg generating cost
with subsidy
indicated budget
government goal on
PV capacity
+
CAPACITY
INSTALLED
subsidy percentage
-
des order rate
AVAILABLE
FUNDS FOR PV
+
DESIRED
BUDGET
+
capacity
depreciation rate
+
+
R2
+
-
C3
CAPACITY ON
ORDER
+
construction time
-
average cost per unit of
capacity installed
avg installation
cost
+
R1
+
-
available
investment
C1
R3
expected profitability
of new investment
-
enterprise
investment+
+
government
investment+
+
+
thermal
generating cost
+
construction start
+
+
-
C2
-
life time
-
avg operating
hours
-
+
 
Figure 4-5. Causal loop diagram: Counteracting feedback loop C2 
 
In the previous discussion, we assume that desired order rate is constant. Now we 
start to address what determines desired order rate in the system.  
The bigger the gap is, the higher desired order rate and finally the more 
government investment will be available. With increased Capacity Installed, capacity 
gap will be reduced in return, where there is no need to order as much as before. The 
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same decline goes to desired order rate, so it constitutes the counteracting loop C2 
(Figure 4-5). It will push the system approaching the goal gradually by adjusting the 
gap. Because there are significant delays in the loop, it may cause oscillations.  
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Figure 4-6. Causal loop diagram: reinforcing feedback loop R1, R2 and counteracting 
loop C1, C2 
 
We add the counteracting feedback loop C2 to the previous discussed loops to 
form the picture at Figure 4-6. But is the desired order rate determined only by that 
capacity gap adjustment? Actually, when the government starts to close the capacity 
gap, not only the functioning capacity, but also the capacity depreciation is taken into 
consideration. So there will be another loop available as well. 
Reinforcing feedback loop R2 and counteracting feedback loop C3: 
Capacity depreciation added to desired order rate 
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Figure 4-7. Causal loop diagram: reinforcing feedback loop R3 and counteracting loop C3 
 
    We can see from Figure 4-7 that the more Capacity Installed is cumulated, the 
more deprecation occurs, which adds up desired order rate. The multiplication of avg 
installation cost and desired order rate constitutes indicated budget. It goes to Desired 
Budget with an information delay. More budget is needed when there is more desired 
order rate. Construction start will be increased when there is more available 
investment. And finally Capacity Installed will be improved. Thus, it constitutes the 
positive feedback loop R3, which drives the system growth. 
At the same time, there is another counteracting feedback loop C3, which will 
slow down the growth of loop R3. With the higher Capacity Installed, the more 
depreciation occurs, which will also excavate Capacity Installed. This counteracting 
feedback loop itself will drain Capacity Installed when there are no other active loops.  
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Figure 4-8. Causal loop diagram: reinforcing feedback loop R1, R2,R3 and counteracting 
loop C1, C2, C3 
 
Figure 4-8 shows the structure of adding reinforcing loop R3 and counteracting 
loop C3 to the picture at Figure 4-7. Now we can get a relatively clear outlook that 
desired order rate is the sum of capacity depreciation and capacity gap adjustment. 
As we know, government provides subsidy to encourage enterprises investing on 
PV power station. The total amount of enterprise investment is determined by 
profitability and government investment. 
Counteracting feedback loop C4: decreased government investment reduces 
enterprise investment 
We can see from Figure 4-9 that enterprise investment varies to the same 
direction with government investment. Under certain profitability, the higher the 
government investment, the higher enterprise investment is achieved, which will 
increase construction start. The improved Capacity Installed will drive down average 
cost, which reduces government investment and enterprise investment in return. Thus 
it is the effect of counteracting feedback loop C4.  
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Figure 4-9. Causal loop diagram: counteracting feedback loop C4 
 
Counteracting feedback loop C5: capacity adjustment through enterprise 
investment 
Besides the cost factor, enterprise investment is also affected by capacity gap 
adjustment. Counteracting feedback loop C5 illustrates the process (Figure 4-10).  
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Figure 4-10. Causal loop diagram: counteracting feedback loop C5  
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When desired order rate is increasing by adjusting the gap, it adds up 
government investment and enterprise investment as well, which enhance 
construction start. The improved Capacity Installed will reduce the capacity gap, 
which lowers desired order rate again. With less budget and government investment, 
enterprise investment will be decreasing as well.  
Reinforcing feedback loop R4: capacity depreciation adding up enterprise 
investment 
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  Figure 4-11. Causal loop diagram: reinforcing feedback loop R4  
  
Because capacity depreciation also affects desired order rate, it has the same 
effect to enterprise investment. The more depreciation rate, the more enterprise 
investment is needed in terms of the higher desired order rate.  
Figure 4-11 shows another reinforcing feedback loop R4, which indicates that 
capacity depreciation adds up des order rate and government investment. The same 
increase goes to enterprise investment. Both of them contribute to the increase of 
Capacity Installed, which will also increase the depreciation rate. Thus the reinforcing 
feedback loop R4 drives Capacity Installed growing. 
We add loop C4, C5 and R4 to the picture in Figure 4-8 and show those loops in 
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Figure 4-12. Now we have four reinforcing feedback loops and five counteracting 
feedback loops here. 
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Figure 4-12. Causal loop diagram: adding loop C4, C5 and R4 
 
So far, we all assume that Available funds for PV is constant. In reality, it is 
driven by total electricity demand. By recruiting a surcharge from the total electricity 
bill, the money is accumulated to form the funds in order to support the renewable 
energy generation. Total electricity demand will increase with the real GDP growth 
multiplied by electricity intensity.  
We can assume that there could be another exogenous positive feedback loop 
driving GDP, which is marked as loop R5 (Figure 4-13). We can deduce that the 
exponential growth in GDP must be driven by a positive feedback loop. Exponential 
growth in GDP causes exponential growth in total electricity demand, which finally 
contributes to exponential growth in Available Funds for PV. It might be another force 
to contribute to the growth of Capacity Installed. 
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Figure 4-13. Causal diagram: Exogenous feedback loop R5 
 
Now we get the whole picture of the system we are going to model (Figure 4-14). 
Besides the above discussion, there are many significant delays existed in the 
counteracting loops. One of the big delays is construction delay, where Capacity on 
order accumulates the capacity which has been started but not installed. The other 
delay is the time it takes when the government perceives the gap to the adjustment of 
gap. There are other information delays lying in the adjustment of funds, cost and 
budget. 
The counteracting loop C2 and C5 are always driving Capacity Installed to catch 
up with the development of desired capacity, the goal of the system. These two 
counteracting loops might be the major forces which contribute to the goal-seeking 
behaviour. Other reinforcing feedback loops like R1, R2 and R3 may drive the system 
an exponential growth trend. While counteracting loop C1 and C4 might result in the 
constrain of money and limit the growth of those loops. It might be the reason of 
sluggish adjustment as mentioned in the problematic behaviour. Because of the delays 
existed in the loops, the corrective actions will constantly overshoots its goal, or 
reverses, then undershoots, and so on. Thus, there should be some oscillations in the 
system besides the growth. 
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Figure 4-14. Major causal loop diagram 
 
As government's goals of PV capacity are taken exogenous as well, which 
directly determine the trend of desired PV capacity and will push Capacity Installed 
exhibit the same behavior as itself. As we can see from the data of government's goals, 
it shows exponential growth pattern. And the goal of the government does have great 
effect to the installed capacity according to the historical data, referring the sharp 
increase of annual installed capacity in the year 2002 and 2006 in figure 2-1. They 
were just the time when the government set the goals on PV system and started 
several programs then.  
4.2 Major Model Assumptions and boundaries 
Several assumptions are adopted for this particular model. 
Major model assumptions: 
1) The output of PV cells and modules China is with adequacy to fill up with the 
demand of PC capacity.  
2) Only PV system in use is addressed without taking production sector in China 
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into consideration. 
3) The specific application fields of PV system are not distinguished. In another 
words, PV capacity installed serves as the indicator of PV market development, no 
matter they are used for on-grid or off-grid generation.  
4) Total cost per unit of capacity is assumed exogenous by using the learning 
curve theory and the industry data. Taking the specific case in China into 
consideration, average generation cost is determined by average cost per unit of 
capacity which varies with the development of installed capacity.  
5) Subsidy percentage is assumed constant at 60% after 2007. It was a newly 
adopted trial policy from 2007 when the Chinese Treasury department reviewed its 
solar program with the introduction of a new solar PV subsidy program, which will be 
granted for both urban BIPV applications and for photovoltaic building systems in 
rural and remote areas (AHK, 2009).  
6) The construction of PV power station is invested mainly by the government 
and enterprises investment only accounts for about 20% before 2006. With the 
introduction of incentive policy, the percentage of enterprise investment might be 
largely increased due to bigger profitability.  
7) Total electricity demand is resting with real GDP and electricity intensity. 
    Model boundaries: 
A model boundary chart is used to communicate the boundary of the model and 
represent its causal structure. It summarizes the scope of the model by listing and 
classifying key variables into three categories. See the following chart for details 
(Figure 4-15). 
GDP growth rate and electricity intensity are affected by many factors which are 
beyond the boundary of this study. Government goal on PV capacity is set by the 
corresponding government sectors in China. Subsidy percentage is relative stable 
according to the programs implemented and their investment.  
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Figure 4-15. Boundary chart of the system under study 
 
With respected to the variables that out of boundary, PV cells production is left 
aside from the model because it is assumed big enough to meet the PV market 
diffusion, which is exactly the same case in reality. Currently what the government 
has been doing is to give subsidy to the construction of PV generation system. The 
amount of subsidy needed is roughly estimated by the government to compensate 
about 60% of the generating cost. Because the major subsidy programs in China 
belong to construction subsidy, it has nothing to do with the specific types of PV 
application. PV generation is already with high priority in energy area in China which 
substitution may not be so quickly. That’s why energy substitution in this case is 
excluded. 
4.3 Stock & Flow Diagram 
    Stock and flow diagram will be discussed for each individual sector in the model, 
capacity construction sector, subsidy needed sector, subsidy source sector, electricity 
demand sector, and cost sector. 
Endogenous 
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…… 
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Excluded 
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application 
-Energy substitution 
...... 
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4.3.1 Capacity construction sector 
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Figure 4-16. Stock and Flow Diagram: Capacity construction sector 
 
Two stocks exist at the top part of Figure 4-16. Capacity Installed is equivalent to 
an accumulation of generators which is conceptualized as a stock here with Kilowatt 
at its unit. Capacity Installed here means the capacity has been finished and ready to 
generate electricity, like functioning capacity. Capacity Installed is built up by 
capacity installation rate and depreciated by capacity depreciation rate at the same 
time. We have the hypothesis that decision makers take the depreciated capacity into 
consideration when deciding desired order rate. 
Because it takes time to install capacity, all the capacity being started is 
accumulated into Capacity on Order. Construction start is assumed to be determined 
by available investment and avg installation cost, which will be discussed in the 
followed sectors. 
When the goals on PV capacity are set by the government, decision makers are 
assumed to compare the installed capacity with the desired one and calculate the 
discrepancy. Adjustment time represents how quickly decision makers try to correct 
the shortfall. If decision makers seek to correct the shortfall quickly, the adjustment 
time would be small and vice versa. Desired order rate, together with average 
installation cost and subsidy percentage determine indicated budget, which will be 
discussed later. Construction will start to build the capacity when available investment 
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is decided. Equations for each variable will be explained later. 
4.3.2 Budget sector 
Figure 4-17 shows the stock and flow diagram of budget sector. Desired budget 
is determined by the change of indicated budget, which is desired order rate 
multiplied by avg installation cost and subsidy percentage.  
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Figure 4-17. Stock and Flow Diagram: Budget sector 
 
Subsidy percentage is a constant value which is set by the government to 
compensate the high cost of PVG and encourage enterprise investment. It is the 
decision made by decision makers on how much they’d like to spend to subsidy PVG. 
Avg installation cost will be discussed at cost sector.  
4.4.4 Budget source sector 
 In order to support the development of renewable energy, the government 
started to establish the Sustainable Funds which is the surcharge collected by the 
government from total electricity demand. Currently the surcharge rate is average 
0.002 CNY/KWp. It can also be changed if the decision makers want to increase the 
total amount of the funds.  
PV fraction is a percentage of total sustainable funds collected into Available 
funds for PV. Because there are several support fields by using the total sustainable 
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funds. PV is only one of them. Currently the fraction is around 25%, which means 
25% of total sustainable funds will be availalbe to form the funds for PV. Utilization 
of funds is the same as government investment which is determined in the capacity 
construction sector.  
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Figure 4-18. Stock and Flow Diagram: Budget source sector 
4.3.4 Electricity demand sector 
Total electricity demand varies with real GDP and electricity intensity (Figure 
4-19). For the unit consistency, there is a convertor (billion convertor) for total 
electricity demand. By using the individual growth rate of GDP and intensity, it is 
easy to simulate the value of real GDP and electricity intensity. Electricity intensity is 
electricity demand per real GDP which can be a proper way in forecasting the 
electricity demand.  
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Figure 4-19. Stock and Flow Diagram: Electricity demand sector 
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4.3.5 Cost sector 
    As we discussed before, total cost per unit of capacity is assumed by the learning 
curve theory which has taken consideration with the technology improvement and 
scale economy. Figure 4-20 shows us the cost data imported into the model. 
 
 
Figure 4-20. Cost data  
Source: (PV industry, 2007 and Nemet, 2006) 
 
    Each unit of capacity is built up; the associated cost will be delivered along with 
the accumulation. The same goes to the depreciation of capacity. So the avg cost per 
unit of Capacity Installed will be the average unit installation cost in the year so far.  
Figure 4-21 shows us the stock and flow diagram for the cost sector. 
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Figure 4-21. Stock and Flow Diagram: Cost sector 
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4.4 Model Formulation 
    The model will be formulated in the same sequence as displayed in stock and 
flow diagram sections.  
4.4.1 Capacity construction sector 
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Table 4-1 Equations for Capacity construction sector 
 Variable Equation Units 
1 Adjustment time  = 1 Year 
2 Available 
investment 
= government investment + enterprise investment CNY/year 
3 Avg generating 
cost with subsidy 
Cost sector  
4 Avg installation 
cost 
Cost sector  
5 Avg operating 
hours 
= 1200 Hours/year 
6 Capacity on 
Order 
= INTEG (+construction start-capacity installation rate) 
INIT= initial capacity on order 
Kw 
7 Capacity 
Installed 
= INTEG (+capacity installation rate-capacity 
depreciation rate) 
INIT= initial Capacity Installed 
Kw 
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8 Capacity 
installation rate 
= Capacity on Order/construction time Kw/year 
9 Capacity 
depreciation rate 
= Capacity Installed/life time 
 
Kw/year 
10 Construction start = Available investment/avg installation cost Kw/year 
11 Construction time =1.5 year 
12 Delayed 
depreciation rate 
= SMOOTH(capacity depreciation rate, 1) Kw/year 
13 
 
Des order rate = gap/AT+ delayed capacity depreciation rate Kw/year 
14 Desired PV 
capacity 
= government's goals on PV capacity Kw 
15 effect of expected 
profit on 
enterprise 
investment 
= effect of expected profitability on enterprise investment 
table(expected profitability of new investment) 
Dmnl 
16 effect of expected 
profit on 
enterprise 
investment table 
= 
[(-1,0)-(1,5)],(-1,0),(-0.504587,0.372807),(-0.223242,0.6
57895),(-0.0152905,1.11842),(0.149847,1.95175),(0.1498
47,1.92982),(0.155963,1.99561),(0.327217,2.91667),(0.5
41284,3.79386),(0.749235,4.40789),(1,4.73684) 
Dmnl 
17 expected 
profitability of 
new investment 
= (thermal generating cost-avg generating cost with 
subsidy)/thermal generating cost 
Dmnl 
18 Enterprise 
investment 
= IF THEN ELSE (Time<2006, government 
investment*0.25,government investment*0.25*effect of 
expected profitability on enterprise investment) 
CNY/year 
19 Gap = desired PV capacity-Capacity Installed Kw 
20 Government's = Government's goals on PVG time series (time) Kw 
 39 
goals on PVG 
21 Government 
investment 
= min(Desired Budget,Available Funds for PV) CNY/year 
22 Indicated budget Budget sector  
23 Life time = 20 year 
24 Subsidy 
percentage 
Budget sector  
25 Thermal 
generating cost 
= thermail generating cost table(Time) CNY/(Kw*
hours) 
 
    Table 4-1 shows the equations for the capacity construction sector. Here in the 
equations, some values for the parameters are estimated or from the result of field 
research. For example, construction time is taken as an average value. It takes 0.5 to 1 
year to build a small solar PV power station in rural district and. The construction 
time will be 1.5 to 2 years for a bigger one. At this stage in the model, an average 
value, 1.5 years are applied and will be tested in the model validation section. Life 
time is according to the field research with the PV power station in Neimeng, China.  
4.4.2 Budget sector 
Desired Budget budget change
Time to change
budget
des order rateindicated budget
subsidy percentage
avg installation
cost
 
Table 4-2 Equations for budget sector 
 Variable Equation Units 
1 Avg installation Capacity construction sector 
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cost 
2 Budget change =(indicated budget-Desired Budget)/Time to change 
budget 
CNY/year/y
ear 
3 Des order rate Capacity construction sector  
4 Desired budget =INTEG (+budget change) 
INIT=initial desired budget 
CNY/Year 
5 Indicated budget = des order rate*avg installation cost CNY/year 
6 subsidy 
percentage 
= 0.6 Dmnl 
7 Time to change 
budget 
=1 year 
 
Equations for budget sector are shown in Table 4-2. There are some estimated 
values for the parameters here as well. Subsidy percentage is set by the government to 
compensate the cost of construction investment and increase the profitability of 
enterprise investment. The policy was announce in the year 2006 and government 
started to implement it then. Before the specific subsidy policy is introduced, almost 
all investment on PVG was by the government. The public data we got so far is that 
the government plans to spend 2.6 billion CNY in 2001. (National PV Plan, 
1996-2000). Another program implemented in 2006 stated to invest 2.8 billion CNY 
on the construction of PVG. 
Time to change budget is estimated because the government will adjust the 
budget every year by looking at the spending in the previous year. The same 
estimation applied to other parameters as time to change funds and time to change 
cost. All of these estimated parameters will be tested in the next section. 
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4.4.3 Budget source sector 
surcharge rate total sustainablefunds per year
Available Funds for
PV
funds collectedutilization PV fraction
 
 
Table 4-3 Equations for budget source sector 
 Variable Equation Units 
1 Available funds 
for PV 
= INTEG(funds collected-utilization) 
INIT=equi available funds for PV 
CNY 
2 Funds collected = total sustainable funds per year*PV fraction CNY/year 
3 PV fraction =0.25 Dmnl 
4 
 
Surcharge rate = 0.002 CNY/(Kw
*hours) 
5 Total sustainable 
funds per year 
=Total electricity demand*surcharge rate CNY/Year 
6 Utilization = government investment CNY/year 
 
4.4.4 Electricity demand sector 
Total electricity
demand
electricity intensity
time series
Billion convertor
Real GDP
GDP change
GDP growth rate
GDP growth rate
time series
Electricity
intensity
intensitiy change
intensity growth
rate
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Table 4-4 Equations for electricity demand sector 
 Variable Equation Units 
1 Billion convertor = 1e+009 Dmnl/billion 
2 Electricity 
intensity 
= INTEG (+intensity change) 
INIT=initial electricity intensity  
(Kw*hours)/
CNY 
3 GDP change = Real GDP*GDP growth rate Billion*CNY
/year/year 
4 GDP growth rate = electricity intensity time series(Time) %/year 
5 GDP growth rate 
time series 
=[(1995,0)-(2020,1)],(1995,0.11447),(1996,0.105382
),(1997,0.100529),(1998,0.101125),(1999,0.0808981
),(2000,0.096024),(2001,0.0923283),(2002,0.099669
9),(2003,0.106595),(2004,0.107016),(2005,0.107252
),(2006,0.120555),(2007,0.114),(2008,0.098) 
%/year 
6 Intensity change = Electricity intensity*intensity growth rate (Kw*hours)/
CNY/year 
7 Intensity growth 
rate time series 
=[(1995,-0.2)-(2100,0.4)],(1995,-0.0255153),(1996,-
0.0487537),(1997,-0.0329965),(1998,-0.0635566),(1
999,-0.0178041),(2000,0.0130022),(2001,-0.0076058
9),(2002,0.0130764),(2003,0.0396902),(2004,0.0398
172),(2005,0.0256788),(2006,0.026757),(2007,-0.13
5284),(2008,-0.00802499),(2020,0) 
%/year 
8 Real GDP = INTEG (+GDP change) 
INIT=initial real GDP 
Billion*CNY
/year 
8 Total electricity 
demand 
=real GDP *electricity intensity*Billion convertor (Kw*hours)/
Year 
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4.4.5 Cost sector 
Capacity
Installed
Available
investment
Capacity on
Order capacity installation
rate
construction start capacity
depreciation rate
life time
construction time
avg operating
hours
avg generating cost
with subsidy
avg installation
cost
Cost on
Order
Cost
Installedcost order rate cost installation
rate
cost depreciation
rate
total cost per unit of new
capacity time series
total cost per unit of
new capacity
avg cost per unit of
capaicty on order
avg cost per unit of
capaicty installed
 
 
Table 4-5 Equations for cost sector 
 Variable Equation Units 
1 
Avg cost per unit of 
capacity on order 
= Cost on Order/Capacity on Order CNY/Kw 
2 
Avg cost per unit of 
capacity installed 
= Cost Installed/Capacity Installed CNY/Kw 
3 
Avg generating cost 
with subsidy 
= IF THEN ELSE(Time<=2006, avg installation 
cost/life time/avg working hours, avg installation 
cost*(1-subsidy percentage)/life time/avg working 
hours) 
CNY/(Kw
*hours) 
4 Avg installation cost = avg cost per unit of capaicty installed CNY/Kw 
5 Cost installation rate 
= capacity installation rate*avg cost per unit of 
capacity on order 
CNY/year 
6 
Cost depreciation 
rate 
= avg cost per unit of capacity installed*capacity 
depreciation rate 
CNY/Kw 
7 Cost on order 
= INTEG(+cost order rate-cost installation rate) 
INIT=8e+007 
CNY 
8 Cost installed 
= INTEG(+cost installation rate-cost depreciation 
rate) 
INIT=8e+008 
CNY 
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9 
Total cost per unit of 
new capacity 
= total cost per unit of new capacity time 
series(Time) 
CNY/Kw 
10 
Total cost per unit of 
new capacity time 
series 
=[(1995,0)-(2020,80000)],(1995,66000),(1996,62700
),(1997,59565),(1998,56586.8),(1999,53757.4),(2000
,51069.5),(2001,48516.1),(2002,46090.3),(2003,437
85.8),(2004,41596.5),(2005,39516.6),(2006,37540.8)
,(2007,35663.8),(2008,33880.6),(2009,32190),(2010,
30577.2),(2011,29048.4),(2012,27595.9),(2013,2621
6.1),(2014,24905.3),(2015,23660.1),(2016,22477.1),(
2017,21353.2),(2018,20285.6),(2019,19271.3),(2020
,18310),(2040,8000),(2050,8000) 
 
5 Model validations  
This section presents model validations. The purpose of model validation is to 
develop justifiable confidence in the model.  
Firstly structure and behavior tests in different model sectors will be conducted 
to ensure that the individual model sector reproduces the behavior predicted by the 
corresponding hypothesis. Then, a series of extreme condition tests will be applied to 
the entire model. After that, behavior reproduction tests will analyze the behavior of 
the model for the time between 1995 and 2008 and the possible gap generated under 
the current policy. These tests examine whether the model is capable of reproducing 
the reference mode in this case. The last part of this sector is sensitivity tests to 
investigate how the model behavior reacts to changes in parameter values. 
Before the testing, the model will be initialized to equilibrium. Submitting the 
model to step increase and decrease in parameter values allows identifying the range 
of behavior mode that the model generate.  
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5.1 Structure and behavior test 
The entire model is divided into two individual sectors (submodel sector I and 
submodel sector II) in order to ensure each part of the model is reflecting the 
reasonable behavior. 
5.1.1 Submodel I structure and behavior test 
    As the hypotheses we made in the last section, loop R1, R2 might drive the 
system exponential growth and loop C1, C3, C4 limit its growth. In order to test the 
hypothesis, firstly, submodel sector I (including Loop R1, R2 and Loop C1, C3, C4) is 
initialized to equilibrium and stars simulating in the year 1995. Structure and behavior 
tests will start by subjecting the model a 10% step increase in desired order rate from 
the year 1998 (in this case, the original desired order rate is exogenous and equals to 
its equilibrium value 3300, and then it is increased to 3630). The base run result is 
shown in Figure 5-1 (in order to show the behavior clearly, we run the model to the 
year 2035). 
The figure illustrates the behavior of Capacity Installed in this submodel I is like 
an S-shape growth. Initially when the system is shocked, Capacity Installed increases 
quickly, which drives down avg installation cost that accelerates construction start 
through the reinforcing loop R1. (Theoretically, the lower installation cost brings 
higher enterprise profitability, which should contribute to construction start through 
the reinforcing loop R2. But here in the test, the model is in equilibrium, the table 
function effect of profitability on enterprise investment is set to 1, which means there 
would be no any effect to enterprise investment even with very high profitability. 
Loop R2 does not work in this case.) However, the growth of Capacity Installed will 
be slowed down because the decreased installation cost also reduces indicated budget 
and available investment, finally the model stabilized to a new state under the effect 
of counteracting loop C1 and C4. Thus, it produces the S-shape behavior.  
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Figure5-1. Base run for submodel I structure and behavior test 
 
In order to test that the behavior is produced by the corresponding structure, 
firstly all the other loops are cut by setting a constant indicated budget (3.33e+007) 
from the year 1998, which means there is no effect between avg installation cost and 
indicated budget. Then government investment and enterprise investment are constant 
as well. There is only one operating loop, reinforcing loop R1. We can see from 
Figure 5-2 that the system shows exponential growth, which means loop R1 
contributes to the rapid growth of installed capacity.  
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Figure 5-2. Submodel I Structure and Behavior Test: With and without all other loops except 
for loop R1  
 
Counteracting feedback loop C4 is cut by setting a constant enterprise investment 
(6.666M). The active feedback loops are loop R1 and C4. We can see from Figure 5-3 
that Capacity Installed behaves like an exponential growth trend, but the growth rate 
is less than that when there is only loop R1 active, which means loop C1 limits the 
growth of the system. 
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Figure 5-3. Submodel I Structure and Behavior Test: With and without loop R1 and C1 
 
Figure 5-4 shows the behavior when loop R1 is cut by setting avg installation 
cost constant at its initial value 12121, which indicates construction start is 
determined by the change of available investment. Available investment varies with 
enterprise investment and government investment, which are driven by loop C4 and 
loop C1 respectively. Compared with the base run, it stabilizes in a lower level, which 
means that reinforcing loop R1 is the major force in driving the system growth. 
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Figure 5-5. Submodel I Structure and Behavior Test: With and without loop R1 
 
Figure 5-6 shows the behavior when counteracting feedback loop C3 is cut by 
setting a constant depreciation rate (3300). It behaves like an exponential growth 
initially and a slightly trend of goal seeking in the end, which means loop C3 is the 
major force limiting the growth of the system.  
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Figure 5-6. Submodel I Structure and Behavior Test: With and without loop C3 
 
We can conclude from the above submodel I structure and behavior tests that the 
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reinforcing feedback loop R1 and R2 contribute to an exponential growth and other 
counteracting feedback loops limit the growth and drive the system an S-shape 
behavior. 
5.1.2 Submodel II structure and behavior test 
We take the hypothesis that counteracting loop C2 and C5 contribute to the 
goal-seeking behavior, which drive the system approaching the government's goals on 
PVG. In this part, submodel II (including Loop R3, R4, C2, C3 and C5) is initialized 
to equilibrium and stars to simulate in the year 1995. Structure and behavior tests will 
start by subjecting the model a 10% step decrease in government's goals on PVG in 
the year 1998. The base run result is shown in Figure 5-11 (in order to show the 
behavior clearly, the model is run to the year 2035). 
The figure illustrates the behavior of Capacity Installed in this submodel II. As 
government's goals on PV increase, capacity gap is enlarged, more desired order rate 
is needed to fill up the gap. The increased Desired budget brings more government 
and enterprise investment. Then Capacity Installed increases as the result of more 
construction start. The more Capacity Installed, the more depreciation rate occurs, 
which increases desired order rate as well. Desired order rate will affect both 
government investment and enterprise investment through loop R3, R4, which 
accelerate the increasing trend of Capacity Installed. That's why the system shows a 
rapid increasing trend initially. With the increasing of Capacity Installed , capacity 
gap shrinks gradually, the counteracting loops constrain growth to act swiftly as the 
goal is approached. There are significant time delays in the counteracting loops. Time 
delays lead to the possibility that the state of the system will overshoot and oscillate 
around the goal. These feedback loops contribute to the S-shape growth with 
overshoot. (Figure 5-11). 
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Figure 5-11. Base Run for Submodel II Structure and Behavior Test 
  
In order to see the behavior of loop C2 and C5, we remove depreciation rate 
from desired order rate from the year 1998, which means loop R3 and R4 have been 
cut then. Figure 5-12 shows the behavior when only loop C2 and C5 operate. We can 
see that Capacity Installed shows almost the same S-shape growth with oscillations 
and finally has the trend of stabilization at a lower level. It indicates that the 
counteracting loops are the major force in driving the system approaching its goal by 
the capacity gap adjustment process. Because of the delays existed in the 
counteracting loops, the state of the system shows overshoot and oscillate. We can 
also see from figure 5-12 that there is steady state error when depreciation rate is not 
considered to desired order rate. The goal will not be achieved then. That also 
indicates the necessarity to take depreciation rate into consideration when deciding the 
equation of desired order rate. 
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Figure 5-12. Submodel II Structure and Behavior Test: With and without loop R3 and R4 
 
    The above structure and behavior tests validate some of the hypothesis put 
forward in the previous section. The major counteracting feedback loops C2 and C5 
drive the state of the system approaching the external goal. It also can be deduced that 
the trend of the external goal will have great effect on the system. In this case, 
government's goals show exponential growth trend, which means one of the  
characteristic behavior - exponential growth may be the result of it. Counteracting 
feedback loops C1 and C4 will limit the growth of other reinforcing loops because of 
the available funds constrain, which also give us some hints that money constrain will 
be an important factor determining the development of PVG in reality. So the 
incentive of enterprise investment may be a effective way for the PVG improvement 
in China. 
5.2 Extreme condition test: 
A "good" model will generate the right behavior for the right reasons. This is true 
not only under ordinary model conditions, but also under extreme conditions. Extreme 
condition test consists of running the model under various extreme conditions that 
may not or rarely happen in reality, so as to investigate whether the model behavior is 
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reasonable under such situations. 
In order to conduct the extreme condition test, the entire model is initiallized in 
equilibrium and starts simulate from 1995 to 2035. Figure 5-13 shows the base run 
behavior.  
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Figure 5-13. Base run for extreme Condition Test 
 
If there is no electricity demand, what will happen to the system? Total 
sustainable funds are collected from surcharge of electricity bills. When total 
electricity demand goes to zero, there should be no money flowed to the funds. 
Available funds for PV should be zero as well. There would be no government and 
enterprise investment contributing to construction start. In order to test the hypothesis, 
we assume that total electricity demand goes to zero from the year 1998 and see the 
behavior of installed capacity. 
When there is no available investment, there would no inflow in the system, what 
only happens should be the depreciation of the existing capacity. From the diagram in 
Figure 5-14 we can see that construction start goes to zero from the year 1998 when 
there is no money available then.  
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Figure 5-14. Extreme Condition Test: construction start: no investment available  
 
The decrease of capacity installation rate is not as suddenly as construction start 
because the existed Capacity on Order needs to be delivered to Capacity Installed 
through the 1.5 years construction time (Figure 5-15).  
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Figure 5-15. Extreme Condition Test: capacity installation rate: no investment available  
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Figure 5-16. Extreme Condition Test: Capacity Installed: no investment available  
 
Capacity Installed starts an exponential decay when capacity installation rate 
decreases to zero, where there is no inflow to Capacity Installed and only depreciation 
occurs since then (Figure 5-16).  
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Figure 5-17. Extreme Condition Test: Capacity Installed: life time=2e10 
 
Another extreme condition test is done by assuming a very long life time of 
installed capacity (life time=2e+10). There will be no depreciation as the life time is 
extremely long and Capacity Installed should be increase rapidly. But from figure 
 55 
5-17 we can see that Capacity Installed does increase initially, it then stabilizes even 
there is no depreciation rate. Figure 5-18 tells us that desired order rate goes to zero 
around the year of 2000, which leads to the zero construction start in 2005. Because 
the real installed capacity is bigger than desired capacity and there is no depreciation, 
capacity gap becomes negative and no desired order rate is needed any more.  
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Figure 5-17. Extreme Condition Test: construction start and des order rate: life time=2e10 
 
    The above results of structure and behavior tests and extreme condition tests give 
us confidence in the model itself. We can say that the model shows reasonable 
behavior under specific structures and extreme conditions.  
5.3 Reference mode replication test 
   In this section, all initial values and exogenous data are applied in the model. By 
running the model, the behavior of variables of interest will be shown and compared 
with the reference mode. 
    As shown in Figure 5-18, the simulated value of the model can roughly replicate 
the reference mode, especially the growth trend in Capacity Installed from 1995 to 
2008. 
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Figure 5-18. Reference mode replication test: Capacity Installed 
 
In order to compare the government's goals with the forecasted values before we 
design the model, we just assumed it is with a linear growth trend of government's 
goal from 2010 to 2020 in depicting the reference mode (as shown in Figure 2-3 in 
session 2). But the PV capacity may not develop linearly in reality, an exponential 
growth trend might be more realistic. So we assume an exponential growth rate for the 
government's goals as the desired capacity in the model and it serves as the goal of the 
system. Then we start to simulate the model from the year 2009 to 2020 under the 
current trial subsidy policy and see the gap between the government's goals and 
simulated values. Figure 5-19 portrays the result of comparision. The gap after the 
year 2009 is obviously, which verifies the supposed viability of government's goals as 
stated in the reference mode. 
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Figure 5-19. Reference mode replication test: Capacity Installed with desired PV capacity 
 
5.4 Parameter sensitivity tests 
The model has passed structure and behavior tests and extreme condition tests, 
which means the logic of the model is reasonable and the equations are robust enough.  
Then reference mode replication test shows us the model does replicate the 
characteristic behavior. 
This section will test the sensitivity of the parameters with highly uncertain data 
or with estimated values. These parameters are listed in Table 5-1. Some of them are 
policy parameters in the model and can be controlled by decision makers, the 
government in this case. 
 
Tabel 5-1 List of parameters for sensitivity testing 
Parameters Estimated values Policy parameters 
Adjustment time  √ √ 
Construction time  √  
Subsidy percentage √ √ 
Time to change budget √ √ 
Life time √  
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PV fraction √ √ 
Surcharge rate √ √ 
 
Here for sensitivity analysis, the whole model is initialized to equilibrium and 
starts simulating in the year 1995. The model is then subjected to a 10% step increase 
in government goals in the year 1998. The base run result is shown in Figure 5-20. 
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Figure 5-20. Base run for sensitivity tests 
 
The results of sensitivity testing are displayed in terms of confidence bounds. A 
graph is generated showing confidence bounds for the output variables Capacity 
Installed and des order rate when the value share was randomly varied around its 
normal value. 
5.4.1 Sensitivity test I: Adjustment time 
Adjustment time is estimated according to the government’s reactions on the 
current development of PV market in China. We assume that the government looks at 
the function capacity each year and compare it with the current goal. We are not sure 
about the exact value. Firstly we analyze the impact of variations in the value of this 
parameter by setting the range of adjustment time from 0.5 years to 2.5 years. 
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Figure 5-21. Sensitivity test: adjustment time=0.5~2.5 
    Figure 5-21 shows the reaction of Capacity Installed and construction start to a 
variation of the parameter value from 0.5 to 2.5 years. Variation leads to an increased 
variation range but not to a variation in the behavior pattern. As shown in the above 
figures, both of these two variables are numerically sensitive to adjustment time.  
5.4.2 Sensitivity test II: Subsidy percentage 
Subsidy percentage is also a policy parameter in the system as discussed in the 
SFD formulation part. 
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Figure 5-22. Sensitivity test: subsidy percentage=0.1~0.9 
 
Subsidy percentage determines enterprise profitability in reality, which will 
affect enterprise investment. The model should have been sensitive to the change of 
subsidy percentage intuitively. As shown in Figure 5-22, the variation of parameters 
does not lead to any change in the behavior pattern. Both of these two variables are 
 60 
not numerically sensitive to the change of subsidy percentage from 0.1 to 0.9.  
5.4.3 Sensitivity test III: Construction time 
Construction time is the time needed in constructing a PV power station. The 
value the this parameter we assumed in the model is 1.5 years, which is according to 
the average construction time for both big and small PV power stations. Now we will 
run sensitivity test to see if the model is sensitive to this parameter. Figure 5-23 shows 
the reaction of Capacity Installed and construction start to a variation of construction 
time from 0.5 to 2.5 years. 
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Figure 5-23. Sensitivity test: construction time=0.5~2.5 
 
We can see that Capacity Installed is not very sensitive to the big change range of 
construction time, which means the uncertain value of construction time does not 
affect the credibility of the model.  
5.4.4 Sensitivity test IV: PV fraction  
    PV fraction is also a policy parameter in the model. Figure 5-24 indicates that 
Capacity Installed and construction start are sensitive to the change of PV fraction 
from 0.1 to 0.5. Because PV fraction in reality is how the government allocates its 
sustainable funds and the fraction on PV has not been changed for years, that's why 
we are confident for the value of PV fraction used in the model. 
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Figure 5-24. Sensitivity test: PV fraction=0.1~0.5 
5.4.5 Sensitivity test V: Life time 
Life time is set as 20 years in the model, which is an average value in different 
size of PV stations according to the field research. In order to test the model's reaction 
to this parameter, we run the sensitivity test by giving life time a variation range from 
15 to 25. Figure 5-25 shows the behavior under this sensitivity test. 
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Figure 5-25. Sensitivity test: life time=15~25 
 
We can see from Figure 5-25 that there is quite small change in Capacity 
Installed under the comparatively big range of change of life time, which means that 
the model is not much sensitive to life time and the estimated value of life time does 
not affect the model too much. 
5.4.6 Sensitivity test V: Time to change budget 
Time to change budget is estimated as 1 year, which means that the government 
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will decide and adjust the desired budget every year. Sensitivity test is run by change 
the time from 0.5 to 2.5 years to see the reaction of the model.  
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Figure 5-26. Sensitivity test: time to change budget=0.5~2.5 
Figure 5-26 tells us that the behaviour of variables of interest has no any changes 
when time to change budget is given a big variation range, which means the model is 
not sensitive to the change of time to change budget. 
5.4.7 Sensitivity test V: Surcharge rate 
Surcharge rate will affect the total sustainable funds per year and also the money 
collected into available funds for PV, it's change should have big impact on Capacity 
Installed. Figure 5-27 indicates the big change range of the model when surcharge rate 
has the variation from 0.001 to 0.003. We can say that both of the two variables of 
interest are numerically sensitive to surcharge rate. They reveal behavior mode 
sensitivity. As surcharge rate is set by the government, we are sure about its value so 
far. 
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Figure 5-27. Sensitivity test : surcharge rate=0.001~0.003 
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5.5 Conclusion of sensitivity test 
 Most of variables with estimated values have no big effect on the behavior of 
the model by running the sensitivity test. The model is most sensitive to the 
parameters like adjustment time, surcharge rate, and PV fraction.  
There are some policy parameters, which the sensitivity tests can give us some 
hints on policy testing. The model is not sensitive to two of the policy parameters, 
subsidy percentage and time to change budget in equilibrium. Because the effect table 
in the model is set to 1 when the model is in equilibrium, which means table function 
does not operate even with any change of profitability. That explains why the model is 
not sensitive to the policy parameter subsidy percentage. So sensitivity tests will be 
run again when the model is not in equilibrium in the policy test and discussion part. 
Besides the estimated value of time to change budget, surcharge rate and subsidy 
percentage are also under the control of the government. Surcharge rate is from public 
data and subsidy percentage is confirmed with the newly issued subsidy policy in 
China. The Chinese Ministry of Finance introduced interim measures for subsidies for 
“solar photovoltaic building applications” in China. A fixed subsidy has been granted 
for both urban BIPV and remote areas (AHK, 2007). The fixed subsidy is around 60% 
of the average generating cost. So we are confident with the value of these parameters 
in the model so far. Sensitivity tests will also be run in policy analysis section to see 
the sensitivity of policies. 
In terms of the other two policy parameters, adjustment time and PV fraction, the 
model is sensitive to their changes. Adjustment time reflects how aggressive the 
government is to make decisions. We assume that the government make decisions 
once per year to fill up the gap and plan Desired budget. PV fraction is determined by 
the government according to the current state plan (PV, 2007). The estimated value in 
the model is also realistic. We can test the efficiency of this policy in the policy 
discussion section. 
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6. Policy test and discussion 
Policy test and discussion in this section will follow the hints raised from the 
above sensitivity tests and discuss the possible policy parameters in how to increase 
China's PVG in the period of the state plan.  
6.1 Policy test and discussion 
    I. Surcharge rate 
Surcharge rate is a policy parameter that the model is sensitive to according to 
the discussion in the sensitivity test part. Therefore, it is recommended that the 
government could increase this parameter. 
In terms of the simulation, the government can raise the surcharge rate to 0.0025 
from 2009 to achieve the goals in 2020 as shown in Figure 6-1. 
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Figure 6-1. Policy test I: surcharge rate=0.002+step(0.0005, 2009) 
 
However, there will be some obstacles to the implementation of this policy, the 
main of which comes from the heavy electricity intensity users, such as the steel 
companies, chemical companies etc. An increase of 0.001 CNY for each Kilowatt of 
electricity can mean a loss of tens of millions of CNY each year for these companies. 
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Therefore, the first one to oppose to this policy could be them.  
Another obstacle comes from all the other ordinary electricity consumers. Due to 
the policy of Coal-Electricity Tariff Automatic Mechanism that has been adopted 
twice in the past 5 years, the price of electricity in China has been increased by 0.0536 
CNY, which is almost 10 percent of the average electricity price in China and is 
obviously a big increase. On the other hand, the per capita GDP of China, in reference 
to the World Bank, was 2460 US dollars in 2008, and ranked 104 in the world, which 
was largely out of step with China’s GDP, which ranked the 3rd and just followed the 
US and Japan (Juanqiong Li, 2006). Therefore, one can imagine the difficulty of 
implementing this policy of improving surcharge rate, which is against the will of 
more than 1.3 Billion people in China. 
The last obstacle lies in the government itself, due to the pressure from CPI. As 
mentioned above, the price of electricity has been increased by nearly 10% in the last 
few years due to the coal-electricity tariff policy. Actually, according to this tariff 
policy, the Chinese people would have been subject to another increase in the 
electricity price last year. However, the government did not let that happen, because 
they know very well that electricity industry is in nature a public welfare 
establishment. An increase in electricity price, even very small, can bring up the price 
increase of a series of goods, thus the CPI in China would go up and threaten the goal 
that government designed for it. This was why the government did not allow 
electricity price to increase in 2008. Therefore, we can say that pressure from CPI is 
also an obstacle to improve the surcharge rate in China. 
To sum up, although an increase in the surcharge rate could be an effective policy 
to increase PVG in China, there are obstacles from three perspectives: high 
electricity-consuming industries, ordinary people and the government itself for the 
sake of social welfare. Especially in the times of worldwide economic crisis, and in 
the presence of already 10 percent increase in electricity price, it might be difficult to 
improve the surcharge rate in China. 
There might be one possible solution to educate both the enterprises and the 
people in China about the importance of developing PV capacity in China, so that the 
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obstacles to implementing the policy from them can be eliminated. Actually, the 
development of PVG in Japan is a good example of this way. However, it might not 
be very realistic to do so in China. Therefore, this could be possible in the future, but 
there is a long way to go. 
 
    II. Subsidy percentage 
Although the model is not sensitive to subsidy percentage as discussed before, 
we are sure it is necessary to run the sensitivity test again when the model is not in 
equilibrium. Because the model is in equilibrium when conducting the sensitivity tests  
in section 5, which means the table function in the model is set to 1. No matter how 
big the subsidy percentage is, it won't affect the profitability and enterprise investment 
won't change at all. That's the reason why the model is not sensitive to the change of 
subsidy percentage. While the real values are put into the model, say the model is not 
in equilibrium, the table function will operate then and subsidy percentage will have 
effect on profitability. Figure 6-2 shows the result of sensitivity test, which justifies 
that the model is quite sensitive to the change of subsidy percentage. Subsidy 
percentage is an effective policy parameter to increase the profitability of enterprise 
investment. 
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Figure 6-2. Sensitivity test (not in equilibrium): subsidy percentage=0.1~0.9 
 
 67 
Therefore, it is recommended that the government increase the subsidy 
percentage so as to improve the profitability of enterprises to encourage investment.  
In fact, this is also a feasible policy which the government has been trying to 
implement in China. In the past few decades, the government has been giving little 
subsidy to the enterprises, which led to its reluctance of investing in PVG. Those 
enterprises that invested in PVG were actually to improve their corporate image, 
rather than for the sake of earning money. In other words, solar PV capacity turned 
into image project for these enterprises, which made it impossible for the PVG to 
really thrive in China. 
However, the government established a newly trial policy to grant a fixed 60 
percent of cost of each Kilowatt of PVG to enterprises from 2007. It is believed by 
some experts in PV field that this policy could be effective in terms of encouraging 
enterprise investment. However, according to this research, 60% subsidy percentage is 
still not enough to accomplish the goals in 2010 and 2020, as shown in Figure 6-3 
(Here we use policy test II-1 to indicate the current policy, say keeping 60% subsidy 
policy constant to 2020). 
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Figure 6-3. Policy test II-1: subsidy percentage=0.6 
 
In order to reach the government’s goals of PVG in 2020, the government has to 
increase the subsidy percentage to 70% from 2009 according to the model (Figure 6-6) 
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(We labeled this policy option as policy test III-2). Therefore, it is recommended that 
the government can increase the subsidy percentage to 70% from the year 2009. We 
can see in Figure 6-4 that the goal in 2020 is achieved, although it still doesn't access 
to the goal in 2010. Because the new policy starts to operate from the year 2009, it 
may not be easy to change the sluggish development very soon.  
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Figure 6-4. Policy test II-2: subsidy percentage=0.6+step(0.1, 2009) 
 
However, by looking at the good examples of countries where the solar PV 
capacity has been well developed, we can find out that these countries, for instance, 
Germany and Japan, granted a very big sum of subsidy to PV capacity in the 
beginning. Then as the PVG developed in their countries, the cost of PVG gradually 
reduced year by year. Then what these countries did was to reduce the subsidy step by 
step, till they did not need to give any subsidy for the development of its PV capacity. 
Therefore, it is recommended that China learn from these countries in this subsidy 
policy. 
Following this mode, it is found that the Chinese government could granted 80% 
subsidy for the construction of PV capacity from 2009 to 2013, then reduce the 
subsidy to 65% from 2013 to 2017, and 50% from 2017 to 2020. From the year 2020, 
the government does not need to grant subsidy to the PVG in China, as shown in 
Figure 6-5 (this policy option is called policy test II-3).  
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Figure 6-5. Policy test II-3: subsidy percentage=0.8(2009-2013), 0.65(2013-2017), 
0.5(2017-2020) 
 
In conclusion, it is recommended that the government increase the subsidy 
percentage from 60 percent to 70 percent, in order to accomplish the government’s 
goals of PVG in the coming decade. In reference to the experience of some countries 
where solar PV is well developed, the Chinese government can adopt a “gradually 
decreasing” subsidy policy, which is to grant 80% from 2009 to 2013, 65% from 2013 
to 2017, 50% from 2017 to 2020 and finally no longer grants any subsidy, because by 
then the cost of solar PV capacity is low enough for its self development.    
 
    III. PV fraction 
As discussed in the sensitivity test part, the model is sensitive to PV fraction. 
Due to the fact that PV fraction is in the control of the policy makers in China, as 
mentioned before, it is justifiable to arrive at the conclusion that PV fraction could be 
an effective policy parameter to improve PVG in China. As PV fraction is increased, 
more funds out of the total sustainable funds will be spent on PV construction, thus 
there will be more Capacity Installed. Therefore, to raise up the PV fraction in China 
could be an effective way out. 
Actually, it is not new to come up with the policy to increase PV fraction so as to 
solve the problem of PVG dilemma in China. Many experts have called on the 
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government to allocate more money to PVG in China since years ago (Fu, 2007). The 
difference is that they did not work out quantitative methods to support the 
suggestions.  
The simulation results shown in Figure 6.6 indicate that achievement of the 
government's goal in 2020 requires a PV fraction closer to 0.30 than 0.25. 
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Figure 6-6. Policy test III: PV fraction=0.25+step(0.06, 2009) 
 
If the policy is feasible, why till now no big improvement has been witnessed in 
the PV fraction in China? According to the analysis of some stockjobbers (Wang & 
Zheng, 2007), the fact is that the PVG in China failed to win over wind energy, which 
is also a form of sustainable energy, in terms of its prospect in the eyes of the 
government. In other words, the unit cost of PV-based electricity is much higher than 
wind-driven electricity, which is about 2 CNY versus about 0.5 CNY per Kwh. 
Therefore, a larger share of funds to wind capacity is an obvious outcome. 
Therefore, to improve PV fraction could be an effective solution to solve the 
problem concerning PVG shortage in China. However, till now it has not become a 
feasible one due to the much higher cost of PV-based electricity.  
This led to the PVG dilemma in China: The smaller PV fraction, the less 
investment into solar PV capacity, the less economy of scale in the PV capacity 
construction, the less competitive of solar PV energy, thus even smaller PV fraction in 
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return. We can see the vicious feedback concerning PV capacity construction in China 
below (Figure 6-7): 
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Figure 6-7. Vicious feedback concerning PV capacity construction  
 
Therefore, it is important that the government should be aware of this vicious 
feedback to keep the disastrous loop from working. Actually, this is also an important 
aim of this research. Although it is not economically wise, for the time being, to 
allocate more money into PV capacity, we still hope the government can make the 
determination to give support to PVG, which has the biggest potential to thrive in the 
future. The development of PVG in some developed countries, such as Germany, 
Japan and the US, is a good illustration of that. 
Therefore, it is recommended that the Chinese government give support to PVG 
in spite of the fact that the cost of it is still high compared to other sustainable energy. 
Actually, this is supposed to be the difference between government and enterprises in 
the way that the former is public oriented while the latter is benefit oriented. We 
believe as the government changes the path dependence of the vicious feedback as 
shown above by improving the PV fraction, the vicious feedback can turn into a 
virtuous feedback loop.  
If that's the case, we can also advise a combination policy by increasing PV 
fraction to 0.28 and make subsidy percentage 70% from 2009 to 2013, 60% from 
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2013 to 2017, and 0.5 from 2017 to 2020 as shown in Figure 6-8. 
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Figure 6-8. Combination policy test: PV fraction=0.25+step(0.3, 2009) and subsidy 
percentage =0.7(2009-2013), 0.6(2013-2017), 0.5(2017-2020) 
  
    IV. Adjustment Time 
Adjustment time should be an effective policy parameter based on the sensitivity 
test results. But it is a bit special as a policy parameter, in terms of the fact that the 
model is sensitive to it when in equilibrium, but it is not sensitive to it when not in 
equilibrium as shown in Figure 6-9. The sensitivity test conducted not in equilibrium 
shows us that the Capacity Installed does not change at all even with the big change 
range of adjustment time. Therefore, to reduce adjustment time alone might not be an 
effective policy to improve the PVG in China.  
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Figure 6-9. Sensitivity test (not in equilibrium): AT=0.5~2.5 
 
However, it could be an effective policy in the presence of other three policies 
discussed above, or two policies, improving PV fraction and subsidy percentage, due 
to the somewhat infeasibility of increasing surcharge rate in China. Figure 6-10 shows 
the results of the sensitivity test of adjustment time, when the PV fraction is 0.31 and 
subsidy percentage is 0.7 from the year of 2009.  
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Figure 6-10. Sensitivity test (increasing PV fraction and subsidy percentage): AT=0.5~2.5 
 
Therefore, adjustment time is also an effective policy parameter after the 
adoption of other two policies, increasing PV fraction and subsidy percentage. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to say that the policy of increasing PV fraction and subsidy 
percentage is effective when the model has reached its bottleneck, the constraints of 
funds. However, after the bottleneck is broken, there can be more policy options, such 
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as reducing adjustment time. 
6.2 Policy robustness test 
Now the robustness of the policy options discussed above is tested by subjecting 
the model to changes that are out of the hand of the government, construction time 
and average life time of PV capacity. In order to do so, the model is run based on three 
scenarios of GDP. The first scenario is to assume that GDP growth rate will keep the 
same value as 2008 to 2020 (high GDP growth rate). The second scenario is to set the 
growth rate linearly drop to 5% in 2020 (medium GDP growth trend). The value of 
GDP growth rate is supposed to be 2% in 2020 in the third scenario (low GDP growth 
trend). This is because GDP is an important index of economic status of a country, 
which in this paper, has big impact on the total sustainable funds, which eventually 
affect the PV Capacity Installed in China. 
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 Figure 6-11. Sensitivity test under three GDP growth rate scenarios: Life time=18~22 
 
As shown in the sensitivity tests in Figure 6-11 and Figure 6-12, the model is not 
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sensitive to the two parameters that are out of the control of the government after 
adopting the policies discussed above, regardless of GDP scenarios in the future. 
Therefore, according to my knowledge, the policies we recommend for the 
government are robust. 
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 Figure 6-12. Sensitivity test under three GDP growth rate scenarios: Construction 
time=0.5~2.5 
 
6.3 Conclusion of policy discusstion  
To sum up, there are four policy options that are effective in terms of achieving 
the government’s goals of PVG in China: to increase PV fraction, surcharge rate, 
subsidy percentage and to reduce adjustment time. However, it might not be feasible 
to increase the surcharge rate due to the obstacles from three perspectives.  
To increase subsidy percentage could be the most feasible policy since the 
government has been trying to implement the policy. However, the current subsidy 
policy might not be effective enough in order to reach the government’s goals. Based 
on the model analysis, it is recommended the government to increase the subsidy 
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percentage to 70%, or make it 80% from 2009 to 2013, 65% from 2013 to 2017, and 
50% from 2017 to 2020, then after that grants no more subsidy.  
To increase PV fraction could be feasible if the government has the 
determination to change the path dependence of the present vicious feedback loop. If 
so, we suggest the government to raise the PV fraction to around 0.30 from 2009 or to 
adopt the combination policy to increase PV fraction to 0.28 and make subsidy 
percentage 70% from 2009 to 2013, 60% from 2013 to 2017, and 0.5 from 2017 to 
2020. 
Anyway, these three policies proved to be effective when the PVG in China has 
reached its bottleneck, shortage of funds. After the bottleneck is broken by adopting 
these three policies, one more policy option becomes available, which is to reduce the 
adjustment time, i.e. the government adopts more aggressive policy.    
7. Conclusions 
Through the experience of model building and simulation in the research project, 
we gained insights into the major problems of the sluggish unfolding of China's 
PV-based generating capacity. Based on that, policy options have been developed and 
tested on its effectiveness to achieve the government's goals of PVG in 2020.  
7.1 Limitations and future work 
Model boundary and assumptions determine the limitations of the work. For 
example, we have not compare the state energy strategy for alternative new energies, 
only focusing on PVG; PV cells and modules manufacturing capacity is assumed 
ample to meet the domestic demand; the average life time and construction time for 
PV-based electricity generating systems with different scales have not been 
distinguished. 
For the future work, the production sector of PV cells and modules could be 
introduced to link with the existing cost sector; and the effect of funds re-allocation to 
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the development of other sustainable energies could also be concerned. In terms of the 
subsidy policy, the major research point could be to investigate the level of on-grid 
price and its possible effect when implemented in large scale.  
7.2 Major findings and contribution 
The research discloses the major problems of the sluggish development of 
China's  PV-based generating capacity. One of the reasons lies in the funds constrain 
on PVG. Because of the high cost of PV generating electricity compared to other 
sustainable energy, funds allocation to PVG is not big enough to sustain its desired 
development. Thus there exists the PV dilemma in China: The smaller available PV 
funds, the less investment into PVG, the less economy of scale in the PVG 
construction, the less competitive of PV energy, thus even smaller PV funds in return.    
The other reason is lack of active enterprise investment. There exists the 
difference between government and enterprises investment in the way that the former 
is public oriented while the latter is benefit oriented. Only when a profitable 
mechanism is established, which benefits enterprises investment, the PVG in China 
can survive by itself. Both of the above reasons result in the sluggish development in 
China's PVG, which also raise doubts about the viability of the government's goals in 
2020. 
The system dynamics model built in the research indicates that the government's 
goals on PVG can not be achieved under the current trial subsidy policy. We have put 
forward several options that are effective in terms of realizing the government's goals. 
Firstly, the government is recommended to adopt a higher subsidy percentage or 
to increase the subsidy percentage much higher initially and then decrease it gradually 
till no more subsidy is needed, which could be a feasible way to encourage enterprise 
investment and greatly increase PVG in China. 
Secondly, the government could reallocate the funds on PV by increasing the PV 
fraction if the government has the determination to change the path dependence of the 
present vicious feedback loop, which contributes to the relieve of funds constrain. 
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The government can be more aggressive in deciding the amount of PVG 
construction when the above two options are available.  
The research findings are the major concerns of the Chinese government when 
the trial subsidy policy has just been implemented. It can be used to guide the 
strategic planning. 
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Appendix A 
A photovoltaic PV generator is the whole assembly of solar cells, connections, 
protective parts, supports etc (see Figure A). 
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Figure A. PV industry chain 
 
Since the first silicon solar cell was reported in 1941 with less than 1% energy 
conversion efficiency, there have been substantial improvements in silicon cell 
performance, culminating in the 25.0% value reported in the present paper. Since 
1983, key results have been independently measured at recognized testing centers 
(Martin A. Green, 1991). Standardization of past measurements shows there has been 
a 57% improvement between confirmed results in 1983 and the present result (Martin 
A. Green, 2009). 
With the impelling of technology improvement and progressing statute, the cost 
of PV module is decreasing gradually from $100/W in 1970, $25/W in 1978, $13/W 
in 1984 and now around $3-4/W. Polycrystal silicon takes the major part of the PV 
modular cost. Table A shows the price and value-added at different production links in 
2007.  
 
Table A. 2007 PV Cells Price and value-added at different production links 
Production links Polycrystal silicon material Wafers Cells Modular 
Price/$/Wp 2.05 2.5 3.05 3.65 
Value-added/$/Wp  0.45 0.55 0.60 
Percentage/% 56.16 12.33 15.07 16.44 
Source: Wang Sicheng (2007) 
Appendix B 
System dynamics is a methodology for studying and managing complex 
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feedback systems. In fact it has been used to address practically every sort of feedback 
system. Stock and flows, along with feedback, are the two central concepts of 
dynamic systems theory (Sterman, 2000). Only the study of the whole system as a 
feedback system will lead to correct results. 
There are several diagramming tools in capturing the structure of systems, 
including Causal loop diagrams (CLDs) and stock and flow maps. A causal diagram 
consists of variables connected by arrows denoting the causal influences among the 
variables. The important feedback loops are also identified in the diagram. Variables 
are related by causal links, shown by arrows. Each causal link is assigned a polarity, 
either positive (+) or negative (-) to indicate how the dependent variable changes 
when the independent variable changes. The important loops are highlighted by a loop 
identifier with shows whether the loop is a positive (reinforcing) or negative 
(counteracting) feedback. 
   Stocks are accumulations. They characterize the state of the system and generate 
the information upon which decisions and actions are based. Stocks give systems 
inertia and provide the with memory. Stocks create delays by accumulating the 
difference between the inflow to a process and its outflow. By decoupling rates of 
flow, stocks are the source of disequilibrium dynamics in system. 
   All dynamics arise from the interactions of two types of feedback loops: 
reinforcing loop and counteracting loop. The basic modes of behaviour in dynamic 
systems are identified along with the feedback structure generating them. These 
modes include growth created by positive feedback; goal seeking, created by negative 
feedback; and oscillations (including damped oscillations, limit cycles and chaos) 
created by negative feedback with time delays.  
 
 
 
